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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to establish a basis for a criticality analysis, considered
here as a prerequisite,  a  first  required step to review the current maintenance
programs,  of  complex  in-service  engineering  assets.  Review is  understood  as  a
reality  check,  a  testing  of  whether  the  current  maintenance  activities  are  well
aligned to actual business objectives and needs. 
This  paper  describes  an  efficient  and  rational  working  process  and  a  model
resulting in a hierarchy of assets, based on risk analysis and cost-benefit principles,
which  will  be  ranked  according  to  their  importance  for  the  business  to  meet
specific goals.  Starting from a multi-criteria analysis, the proposed model converts
relevant criteria impacting equipment criticality into a single score presenting the
criticality level.
Although detailed implementation of techniques like Root Cause Failure Analysis
(RCFA)  and  Reliability  Centred  Maintenance  (RCM)  will  be  recommended  for
further  optimisation  of  the  maintenance  activities,  the  reasons  why  criticality
analysis  deserves  the  attention  of  the  engineers,  maintenance  and  reliability
managers  are  here  precisely  explained.  A  case  study  is  presented  to  help  the
reader to understand the process and to operationalize the model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In  this  paper  we  deal  with  the  strategic  part  of  the  maintenance  management
definition  and  process  (as  in  EN  13306:2010  [1]),  which  is  related  to  the
determination of maintenance objectives or priorities and the determination of
strategies. A more operational second part of the definition refers to the strategies
implementation  (maintenance  planning,  maintenance  control,  supervision,  and
continuous improvement). 
Part  of  this  strategy  setting  process,  that  we  refer  to,  is  devoted  to  the
determination of the maintenance strategies that will be followed for the different
types  of  engineering  assets  (i.e.  specific  physical  assets  such  as:  production
processes,  manufacturing facilities,  plants,  infrastructure,  support  systems,  etc.).
In fact, maintenance management can also be considered as “…the management of
all assets owned by a company, based on maximizing the return on investment in
the asset” [2], also their safety and their respect for the environment.  Within this
context, criticality analysis is a process providing a systematic basis for deciding
what assets should have priority within a maintenance management program [3],
and has become a clear business need in order to maximize availability during
assets’ operational phase.
This type of assets criticality analysis, performed during their operational
phase and for maintenance purposes, is therefore different to criticality analysis
which is carried out during assets design. At that point, the objective (more linked
to asset’s reliability assessment) is to identify critical areas so that different design
alternatives  to  achieve  a  specified  availability  target  can  be  optimized  and
compared [15].  Description of  specific  techniques for  criticality analysis  during
design can be found in MILSTD 1629A [16], also in [17] and [18]. These techniques
use,  for  instance,  the  Risk  Priority  Number  (RPN)  method,  fuzzy  logic  or
approximate reasoning to prioritize failures modes (not assets).
When  prioritizing  assets  for  maintenance  purposes,  and  during  their
operational phase, a large number of quantitative and qualitative techniques can
be found in the  literature  [3].  On some occasions,  there  is  no hard data about
historical  failure rates,  but the maintenance organization may require a certain
gross assessment  of  assets priority to be carried out.  In these cases,  qualitative
methods may be used and an initial assets assessment, as a way to start building
maintenance operations effectiveness, may be obtained [10]. 
This  paper,  however,  is  about  the  process  to  follow on other  occasions,
lately becoming more frequent, when the maintenance organization has important
amounts of data for complex in-service assets for which a certain maintenance
strategy  has  been  previously  developed  and  implemented.  Therefore  we  have
evidences of assets behavior for current operational conditions of the asset, and
we launch the criticality analysis with the purpose of adjusting assets maintenance
strategies to business needs over time. 
Most of current quantitative techniques for assets criticality analysis use a
weighted scoring method defined as variation of the RPN method used in design
[4]. These weighted scoring methods might appear simple, but in order to reach
acceptable results,  a precise procedure should be considered when determining
factors, scores and combining processes or algorithms [15]. The analysis involves
another  important  issue  which  is  the  level  of  detail  required,  compromising
objective effectiveness (missing focus of subsequent maintenance efforts) and also
data collection efforts.
The criticality number to obtain (C), as a measure of risk associated to an
asset,  is  derived  by  attaching  a  numerical  value  to  the  probability  of  failure
(function  loss)  of  the  asset  (the  higher  probability,  the  higher  the  value),  and
attaching  another  value  to  the  severity  of  the  different  categories  of  asset
functional loss consequences (the more serious consequences for each category,
the higher the value). The criteria and the relative weighting to assess severity and
probability  may  vary  widely  for  different  companies  according  to  their
maintenance objectives and KPIs. The two numbers are multiplied to give a third
which is the criticality number (C). Of course, assets with the higher (C) will be
recognized to be the more critical assets and will deserve special attention from
the maintenance (sometimes now called: assets) management organization. 
The reader may notice now how the “detectability” factor, used as part of
the equation of RPN in design, is not considered now in operations in C. This is
because detectability is not an attribute of the assets we are ranking, but of the
failure modes for which design alternatives were explored (see [12]). 
The inspection and maintenance activities will be prioritized on the basis of
quantified risk caused due to failure of the assets  [6].  The high-risk assets  are
inspected and maintained usually with greater frequency and thoroughness and
are maintained in a greater manner, to achieve tolerable risk criteria [7].
Although this  technique  is  becoming popular,  some authors  mention [6]
that most of the risk analysis approaches are deficient in uncertainty and sensitivity
analysis.  This  may  constrain  yielding  proper  results  and  decisions  based  on
misleading results may generate non-essential maintenance efforts spent in less
important  areas.  To  avoid  this,  risk  analysis  for  asset  criticality  should  be
evaluated in  well  planned manner ensuring  that  significant  sources  of  risk  are
reduced or eliminated [5]. 
In  this  paper  we  propose  a  criticality  analysis  taking  into  account  the
following process design requirements: 
1. The process must be applicable to a large scale of in-service systems within
a  plant  or  plants.  A  reason  for  this  is  the  fact  that  PM programs  to  be
evaluated using this criticality analysis are set by plant equipment (placed
in a technical location in the plant), and therefore we are forced to deal with
this large number of items in the analysis;
2. The scope of the analysis should be, as mentioned in previous point,  the
same for which the current PM program is developed and implemented;
3. The analysis should support regular changes in the scale adopted for the
severity effects of the functional losses of the assets (this is a must to align
maintenance strategy in dynamic business environments).
4. The process must allow easy identification of new maintenance needs for
assets facing new operating conditions; 
5. General  guidelines  to  design  possible  maintenance  strategy  to  apply  to
different type of assets according to the results of the analysis (criticality
and sources of it) should be provided;
6. Connection with the enterprise asset management system of the company
should be possible to automatically reproduce the analysis, with a certain
cadence, over time;
7. The process should be tested in industry showing good practical results.
In the sequel the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows first, briefly,
the proposed criticality analysis process description. Then, more precisely and in
the different Subsections, the notation of the mathematical model supporting the
process is  introduced,  as well  as  every step of the  process  to  follow,  including
model equations. Along this second Section of the paper, a practical example helps
to exemplify the process and model implementation. Section 3 tries to turn, the
previous process and model, into a powerful management tool. In order to do so,
this Section explains how to handle data requirements properly and how to benefit
from model outputs and results using suitable graphical representations. Section 4
is  devoted  to  the  interpretation  of  possible  results,  offering  clear  guidelines  to
ensure maximum benefits from the analysis. Conclusions of the paper are finally
presented in Section 5. 
2. PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND RATIONAL
In this Section we describe a comprehensive process to be followed by a criticality
review  team (defined  as  in  [11])  in  order  to  generate  a  consistent  criticality
analysis  based  on  the  use  of  the  PRN  method  together  with  multi  criteria
techniques to select the weights of factors deriving in the severity of an asset. 
The process consists in a series of steps determining the following: 
1) Frequency levels and the frequency factors;
2) Criteria and criteria effect levels to assess functional loss severity;
3) Non admissible functional loss effects;
4) Weights (contribution) of each criteria to the functional loss severity;
5) Severity categories, or levels, per criteria effect;
6) Retrieving data for actual functional loss frequency for an element (r);
7) Retrieving data for maximum possible effects per criteria;
8) Determination of Potential asset criticality at current frequency;
9) Retrieving data for real effects per criteria;
10)Determining observed asset criticality at current frequency;
11)Results and guidelines for maintenance strategy.
The  first  five  steps  of  the  process  determine  the  elements  configuring  the
algorithm in the mathematical model that will be later used to rank assets, once
their  in-service  operational  data  is  retrieved  from  the  enterprise  assets
management system. Steps 6, 7 and 9 are data gathering related steps. In these
Sections the reader will see that assets’ data required will be:
 Engineering  data  concerning  maximum  possible  asset  functional  loss
effects (step 7); and 
 Operational  data  showing  information  about  current  frequency  of  their
functional loss (step 6) and functional loss effects (step 9);
Steps  8)  and  10)  are  presenting  results  for  potential  and  current  observed
criticality  of  the  assets.  Discussion  of  these  two  facts  will  drive  to  a  set  of
conclusions and action items that will be presented in Step 11).
The process followed to assess the criticality of the different assets considered is
supported by a mathematical model, whose notation is now presented:
i: 1…n  criteria to measure severity of an element functional loss,
j: 1…m levels of possible effects of a functional loss for any criteria,
z: 1…l levels of functional loss frequency,
e ij: Effect j of the severity criteria i,
w i: Weight given to the severity criteria i by experts, with ∑i=1
i=n
w i=1 ,
M i: Maximum level of admissible effect for criteria i , with 
M i≤m ,∀ i
,
MS : Maximum severity value,
v ij : Fractional value of effect j for the severity criteria i, 
S ij : Severity of the effect j for the severity criteria i,
perij : Potential effect j of criteria i for the functional loss of element r, 
f r : Value for the frequency of the functional loss of element r,
ff z : Frequency factor for frequency level z,
ferz : Boolean variable with value 1 when  z is  the level of  the observed
frequency of element r functional loss, 0 otherwise, 
af z : Average frequency of functional loss for frequency level z,
Sr : Severity of the functional loss of element r,
Cr : Criticality of element r,
rerij :   Current probability of the effect j of criteria i for the failure of r,
S 'r : Current observed severity of the functional loss of element r, 
C ' r : Current criticality of element r, 
Subsequent  Sections  of  the  paper  present  precisely  the  different  steps  of  the
process,  and introduce the mathematical  model  supporting them. The model  is
applied to an example which illustrates a practical industrial scenario.
2.1. DETERMINING FREQUENCY LEVELS AND FREQUENCY FACTORS
To manage  the  frequency  levels  a form of Pareto  analysis is  used, in  which  the
elements  are  grouped into  z  frequency categories  according to  their  estimated
functional loss frequency importance.  For example, for z=4, the categories could
be  named:  very  high,  high,  medium  and  low  functional  loss  frequency.   The
percentage of elements to fall under each category can be estimated according to
business practice and experience for assets of  the same sector and operational
conditions (for instance, according to existing operating conditions of our assets, in
Table 1 the review team has decided to define a category named “Low”, including a
group of 5 assets having less than 2 failures per year [f/y] and with an average
functional  loss  of  1.2  f/y,  easing  our  corrective  maintenance  operations,  and
serving as a reference for the rest of the assets selected categories. Assets with
more than 7 f/y are considered to complicate enormously corrective operations,
and as soon as severity in consequences of the functional loss increases, current
management will consider those assets as very critical). Then, average values for
frequencies falling inside each group can be estimated and frequency factors per
category calculated (see example in Table 1).
In  the  model  mathematical  formulation,  if  af z is  the  average  frequency  of
functional loss for frequency level z, then the frequency factor vector is defined as
follows:
ff z=
af z
af 1  , for z=1 .. .l  levels of functional loss frequency
Asset f/y Asset f/y Category (z) % (z) afz ffz
a 1 i 8 Very high 10% 8 6.7
b 2 d 7
High 20% 6.5 5.4
c 5 h 6
d 7 c 5
Medium 20% 4 3.3
e 3 e 3
f 1 b 2
Low 50% 1.2 1.0
g 1 j 1
h 6 g 1
i 8 a 1
j 1 f 1
Table 1. Calculation of frequency factors per selected functional levels
2.2. CRITERIA, AND CRITERIA EFFECT LEVELS, TO ASSESS FUNCTIONAL 
LOSS SEVERITY:
This  part  of  the  analysis  should  reflect  the  business  drivers  recognized  by
management  and  shareholders  [15].  For  the  severity  classification,  this  study
focuses the attention on both,  safety and cost criteria (similarly to [6]).  For the
safety severity categories, similar hazard severity categories to the ones used in
MIL-STD-882C are adopted. This standard proposes four effect categories that can
now be reframed as follows: 
 catastrophic, could result in multiple fatalities
 critical, resulting in personal injuries or even one single fatality
 marginal, and 
 negligible
As cost  factors  we may selected different  criteria  for  which the functional  loss
effect can be classified in different levels that can, at the same time, be converted
into cost using a certain contract or standard that the company must honor. 
In the example for this paper, the following criteria are selected (assuming that we
are dealing with the criticality of a collective passenger’s transportation fleet):
 Operational reliability: measuring the potential impact of a functional loss
to the system where the asset is installed. The effects could be classified in
different levels like: No Affection (NA), stopping the system less than x min
(S <x), stopping the system more than x min (S> x) or leaving the system
out of order (OO). Each one of these affection levels can be later translated
to  cost  of  the  functional  loss,  and  the  corresponding  factors  could  be
obtained.
 Comfort: evaluating whether the functional loss of the element may: have
no affection on comfort (NA), affect a passenger (P), a car (C) or the whole
train (T). Again, each one of these affection levels can be later translated
into  cost  of  the  functional  loss,  and  the  corresponding  factors  could  be
obtained.
 The "corrective maintenance cost" could be selected as another cost related
criteria.  Effects  could  be  classified  in  very  high,  high,  medium  and  low
corrective maintenance cost, and we could proceed similarly to what has
been  presented  in  Table1,  classifying  the  elements’  costs  and  finding
averages costs and the corresponding factors for each effect classification
level.
2.3. DETERMINING NON ADMISSIBLE FUNCTIONAL LOSS EFFECTS
At this point, the process requires the definition of those functional loss effects that
would be considered as “non-admissible” for each specific criterion. For instance, in
Table 2, those categories of effects being considered non admissible are presented
with dark grey inverse video. For this case study the review team has considered
that catastrophic & critical effects on “Safety”, besides the “Out of order” condition
of the system, are non-admissible effects of a functional loss of an element. 
The model will allocate a maximum value for overall severity (MS) to those assets
(elements  of  the  transportation  fleet)  whose  functional  loss  may produce  non-
admissible effects for any of the selected criteria. Therefore, those elements will
become of maximum severity regardless their functional loss effect on any other
criteria under consideration.
Criteria to measure Severity
Safety criteria
Cost related criteria
Operational reliability Comfort CM Cost
Category of effects per criteria
Cat & Cri         (C) OO Train          (T) VH  (10%)
Marginal        (M) S>x Car             (C) H    (20%)
Negligible      (N) S<x Passenger (P) M   (20%)
NA NA NA L    (50%)
Table 2. Table presenting non admissible effect categories
In the mathematical model we will use the following notation for this purpose:
M i: Maximum level of admissible effect for criteria i , with 
M i≤m ,∀ i
MS : Maximum value for overall severity
And in our example, 
[ i ]=safety, operational reliability, comfort, CM cost
and  [M i ]=3,3,4,4  as  maximum  levels  of  admissible  effects  for  each  criteria,
finally 
it will be considered MS=100.
2.4. CRITERIA WEIGHTS IN THE FUNCTIONAL LOSS SEVERITY
To determine these weights various considerations can be taken into account, for
instance:
• Criteria correlation to business KPI’s.
• Budget  allocated  to  each  cost  related  criteria  within  the  maintenance
budget.
• Impact of each criterion on the brand and/or corporate image. For instance,
in the previous example the management (or the criticality review team)
could consider that "operational reliability" and/or "comfort" criteria could
have  also  impact  on  the  brand  image,  increasing  its  weight  versus
corrective maintenance cost. 
• Considerations measuring the importance of the safety factor considering
standards, contracts or market rules.
• Etc.
Regardless  all  these  considerations,  assigning  criteria  weights  may  contain  a
certain  subjective  judgments  from  the  experts  involved.  In  order  to  make  this
judgment as much consistent as possible, AHP techniques can be used, and a model
presenting the multi-criteria classification problem in a logic decision diagram, can
help to solve the multi-criteria decision sub-problem at the highest decision nodes
of  the  diagram  (the  reader  is  referred  to  Bevilacqua  et  al.  [8]  for  additional
information concerning AHP utilization with this purpose). A major advantage of
the AHP approach is that both qualitative and quantitative criteria can be included
in the classification scheme. In addition, the assignment of weights to the different
parameters is considered as a positive characteristic of the method [9]. The reader
is  referred to  [3]  (Section 9.4.1,  steps  of  the  process  6 & 7,  pages  121 & 122,
concerning  the  Quantification  of  judgments  on  pair  alternative  criteria and  the
Determination  of  the  criteria  weighting  and  its  consistency)  for  a  detailed
description of the utilization of the AHP in our methodology.
On the other hand, the amount of subjectivity involved in the process of pair-wise
comparisons  is  often  viewed  as  the  main  limitation  of  this  method,  another
problem arises when the number of  alternatives to rank increases forcing to an
exponential increase in the number of pairwise comparisons . That´s why we just
limit the method utilization to the severity criteria level, not to the asset criticality
classification level.
In the example of this paper, w i , weight given to the severity criteria i by experts,
resulting from the AHP analysis are assume to be equal to  [w i ]=10 ,30 ,20 ,40 .
This means, for instance, that the review team considers corrective maintenance
cost consequences are two times more important than those related to comfort, or
that  operational  reliability  consequences  are  three  times  more  important  than
admissible safety consequences. Notice that, this is considered, after using AHP, to
be a subjective but consistent judgment of the review team. 
2.5. DETERMINING SEVERITY PER CRITERIA EFFECT
In the mathematical model proposed, an effects severity matrix is defined, for any
element included in the analysis (r), as follows:
S ij={MS, for Mi< j≤m, ∀ iwivij , for 1≤ j≤M i , ∀ i     (1)
Where
v ij=
eij
eik  , with k= M i  and j≤Mi , and with v ij=1 for j=Mi  and ∀ i
And eij is the effect j of the severity criteria i, and vij is the fractional value of
effect j for the severity criteria i. 
In the example we are following, the effects matrix is included (last 4 rows)
in  Table  3,  where  relative  values  for  the  different  effects  for  each  criteria  are
presented. Units for these relative values are based on cost (for  i=2,3,4) or in a
dimensionless  rule  of  proportionality  of  the  effect  (i=1).  The  interpretation  of
Table 3,  is  as follows:  a comfort  functional loss,  for instance,  that  in Table 2 is
presented as having an effect to the entire train, may have a potential cost of 4,500
$; or, another example, an admissible effect on operational reliability stopping the
system more than x minutes (s>x), may cause a potential cost of 10,000 $.  
Criteria to measure Severity
Safety criteria
(dmnl)
(weight:10%)
Cost related criteria 
(e.g. based on penalization cost and CM budget, $)
Operational reliability
(weight:30%)
Comfort
(weight:20%)
CM Cost
(weight:40%)
Category of effects per criteria and functional loss
Non admissible Non admissible 4,500 300
1,5 10,000 3,000 150
1 5,000 600 50
0 0 0 10
Table 3. Effects matrix per functional loss
At this point is important to understand that, for a given functional loss, these are
maximum possible effects per criteria, but not actual observed effects (later, real
observed effects of functional losses, will be considered in the analysis, which are
in fact conditional probabilities to reach a certain effect once a functional loss takes
place). In the example that is presented, the corresponding effects severity matrix
(according to Equation 1, and for MS=100) is included in last for rows of Table 4.
Criteria to measure Severity (Sij)
Safety criteria
(dmnl)
(weight:10%)
Cost related criteria 
(e.g. based on penalization cost and CM budget, $)
Operational reliability
(weight:30%)
Comfort
(weight:20%)
CM Cost
(weight:40%)
Category of effects per criteria and functional loss
100 100 20 40 
10 30 13.3 20
6,6 15 4 6.3
0 0 0 1,2
Table 4. Effects severity matrix per functional loss
The interpretation of Table 4, is as follows: a comfort functional loss impacting the
train (maximum effect), will count for 20 points of severity (up to 100), while a
comfort functional loss impacting only one car will count for 13.3 points of severity
(this  is  calculated  proportionally  to  the  functional  loss  potential  cost  values).
Notice  how  a  non-admissible  effect  of  a  functional  loss  will  count  for  a  100
(maximum value) regardless the effect in any other criteria.
2.6. RETRIEVING DATA FOR ACTUAL FUNCTIONAL LOSS FREQUENCY
Actual data for frequency of functional losses can be retrieved and captured in the
variables ferz,  these variables conform, for each asset r, a vector of l elements, once
there  are  z=1 .. .l  levels  of  functional  loss  frequency.  Thus,  ferz are  Boolean
variables with values:
                1,   When z is the observed frequency category of element r functional loss
 ferz =
                        0,  Otherwise.
 
Example:  For  functional  loss  frequencies  expressed  in  Table  1,  the  criticality
analysis review team could retrieve the asset b functional loss frequency and this
would expressed as:
[febz]= 0, 0, 1, 0
The frequency factor to apply to this element would be the result of the following 
scalar product:
f r=∑
z=1
z=l
ff z ferz
(2)
In our example:
fb =1x0+3.3x0+5.4x1+6.7x0=5.4
And therefore 5,4 would be the frequency to consider for the element when finally
calculating its criticality.
2.7. RETRIEVING DATA FOR MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EFFECTS PER CRITERIA
Data concerning maximum potential effects, when a functional loss of an element
happens,  can  be  retrieved  and  captured  in  the  variables  perij  ,  these  variables
conform, for each asset r, a matrix of n x m elements, once there are i: 1…n criteria
to measure severity of an element functional loss, and  j:  1…m levels of possible
effects of a functional loss for any criteria. . Thus,  perij are Boolean variables with
values:
                1,    When j is the level of maximum potential effect of the functional loss 
perij, =                     of an element r and for the severity criteria i
                        0,    Otherwise.
 
Assume, as an example, that for  the effects severity matrix expressed in Table 4,
the criticality analysis review team retrieves potential effects of a functional loss of
an element r, this could be represented with the following potential effects matrix:
[pebij]= [1 0 0 00 1 1 00 0 0 10 0 0 0]
Then, we can model the Severity of the functional loss of element r as follows:
Sr=Min(MS ,∑
i=1
i=n
∑
j=1
j=m
perijS ij)
(3)
In the previous example, the severity of the asset b would result in:
Sb=Min(100 ,100+30+13.3+6 .3 )=100
This, in fact, represents a weighted average type of algorithm, where the weights
are introduced through the value of the different criteria effects, as calculated in
Equation 1. In this way, consistency in the Severity calculation of one element with
respect  to another is  ensured.  It  has been experience how by giving  maximum
severity  to  inadmissible  effects,  like  for  instance  in  our  previous  example,  the
different  roles  of  actors  represented  in  the  review  team  are  safeguarded  (for
instance, safety department people in the review team of our example), discussions
in the meetings are reduced and consensus is more easily reached.
Notice how, in case of good data integrity for frequency and functional loss effects
of  the  elements  under  analysis,  the  review team can and  must  concentrate  its
efforts in the selection of the severity criteria and in establishing proper weights
according to business needs. 
2.8. DETERMINING POTENTIAL CRITICALITY AT CURRENT FREQUENCY
The criticality of the element is finally calculated as 
Cr=f r×Sr (4)
Thus, for asset b of the example previously introduced:
Cb=1×100=100
2.9. RETRIEVING DATA FOR REAL EFFECTS PER CRITERIA
Actual data for real element functional loss effects can be retrieved and captured in
the  variables  rerij,  these  variables  conform,  for  each asset  r, a  matrix  of  n  x  m
elements,  once  there  are  i:  1…n criteria  to  measure  severity  of  an  element
functional loss,  and  j:  1…m levels of possible effects of a functional loss for any
criteria. 
rerij =  current probability of the effect j of criteria i for the functional loss of
element r, with  ∑
j=1
j=m
ℜrij=1.
Assume, as an example, that for  the effects severity matrix expressed in Table 4,
the criticality analysis review team could retrieve data concerning  real element
functional loss effects for asset r, this could be represented with the following real
effects matrix:
[rerij]= [ 0 0 0 00 0.5 0.1 00.2 0.3 0.8 0.90.8 0.2 0.1 0.1]
Then, we can model the Severity of the functional loss of element r as follows:
S 'r=Min(MS ,∑
i=1
i=n
∑
j=1
j=m
rerijS ij)
 (5)
In the previous example, the severity of asset r would result in:
S 'b=Min [100 ,6 . 6×0.2+(30×0 .5+15×0 . 3 )+(13 .3×0 .1+4×0 .8 )+6 .3×0 .9 ]=31.1
2.10. DETERMINING OBSERVED CRITICALITY AT CURRENT FREQUENCY
The criticality of the element is finally calculated as 
C ' r=f r×S ' r (6)
In the previous example presented
C 'b=1×31.1=31 . 1
So real criticality is much lower than potential (100)
3. CRITICALITY ANALYSIS AS A PRACTICAL MANAGEMENT TOOL
For complex in-service engineering assets, the implementation of the model must
be  fast  and  automatic  over  time.  Also,  the  results  of  the  analysis,  and
corresponding maintenance strategic actions carried out as a consequence of it,
must be accountable in the future. 
In order to easy the data entry process (considering now the need to rank an
important amount of elements),  and to make the interpretation of the  analysis
results user friendly, the following process, as a result of previous implementation
in complex and large engineering assets, is recommended:
1. Retrieve asset’s data for frequency and potential severity effects (Table 5). Data
must show assigned frequency and severity criteria categories, per asset. It is
frequently convenient, to save time and easy analysis replications, that the list
of  assets  can  be  directly  retrieved  (to  the  scope  of  the  analysis)  from  the
Enterprise Assets Management System database.
 
Assets
Frequency Severity criteria
FE
PE1
(Safety)
PE2
(Op. Reliability)
PE3
(Comfort)
PE4
(CM Cost)
a L L M VH H
b L VH H H M
c M L M L H
d H H H H M
e M L M M L
f L L L H M
g L M VH M L
h H H L L L
i VH L VH M L
j L L L L L
Table 5. Frequency & Potential effects qualitative matrix:
2. Convert this qualitative data into quantitative data (Table 6) considering the
weights of each criteria and the model explained in previous paragraph. It is
very important to separate qualitative and quantitative datasets. A reason for
this  is  related to  the possibility  to  test  sensitivity  of  changes in the criteria
weights for criticality assessment, modifying the final ranking of the assets, but
not changing data retrieved in step 1.
Assets
Frequency Severity criteria Severity Criticality
FE PE1 PE2 PE3 PE4
a 1 0 6,6 20 20 46,6 46,6
b 1 100 10 13,3 6,3 100,0 100,0
c 3,3 0 6,6 0 20 26,6 87,8
d 5,4 30 10 13,3 6,3 59,6 321,8
e 3,3 0 6,6 4 1,2 11,8 38,9
f 1 0 0 13,3 6,3 19,6 19,6
g 3,3 15 100 4 1,2 100,0 330,0
h 5,4 30 0 0 1,2 31,2 168,5
i 6,7 0 100 4 1,2 100,0 670,0
j 1 0 0 0 1,2 1,2 1,2
Table 6. Current frequency and  Potential effects quantitative matrix.
3. Se the quantitative criteria for the assignment of the category low, mid or high
criticality to an asset, like, for instance, in Table 7.
Criticality
level
% of
assets
Criticality
value interval
Assets
Area color  in
matrix (Fig. 1&2)
Critical 20% 326-670 g, i Dark grey
Semi-
critical
30% 90-325 b, d, h Grey
Not critical 50% 0-89 a, c, g, e, f, j White
Table 7. Criticality criteria assignment.
This decision may condition organizational efforts to be dedicated later to the
management of the different category of assets. This is a business issue and
consensus  should  be  reached  within  the  review team and  the  management
team before any further process development.
4. Populate, with assets, the potential criticality matrix representation (in Figure
1).  Notice  that  this  matrix  considers  current  (observed)  frequencies  and
potential severities, for each equipment functional loss.
    #            ffz           
1 6,7 i
2 5,4 h d
3 3,3 E c g
4 1 j F a b
S 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100
# 1 2 1 1 1 1 3
Figure 1. Potential criticality matrix representation
Notice that shaded areas in the matrices in Figures 1 and 2, mean minimum
criticality level of all elements in that area.
5. Retrieve  quantitative  data,  using  a  unique  matrix,  and  now  for  current
observed frequency and severity effects per element (See Table 8). 
Table 8. Frequency and current observed effects quantitative matrix.
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6. Populate, with assets, the  current criticality matrix representation (Figure 2).
Notice that this matrix considers current (observed) frequencies and severities,
for each equipment functional loss.
    #            ffz           
1 6,7 i’
2 5,4 h’ d’
3 3,3 c’  e’  g’
4 1 f’, j’ a’ b’
S 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100
# 4 2 2 2
Figure 2. Current criticality matrix representation
7. To easy further analysis, populate with both assets with potential and observed
functional loss severity, a criticality matrix representation (Figure 3).  In the
matrix in Figure 3 we can compare results obtained in two previous criticality
matrices: potential and current.
                 ffz           
6,7 i’ i
5,4 h’ d’ H d
3,3 c’ e, e’ c, g’ g
1 j,f’,j’ f, a’ b’ a b
S 0-9 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100
Figure 3. Potential  and Current criticality matrices representation
8. Automatic  generation of  the  criticality report,  listing the assets  ranking per
criticality  levels,  and  within  each  level,  classify  the  assets  by  common
frequencies and severities. Rational for this is related to the type of strategy
that  will  be  required to  manage them.  Realize  that,  for  managers,  the  most
important  outputs  from  this  analysis  are  these  lists  of  assets  falling  under
different criticality categories and subcategories.  
4. INTERPRETATION OF CURRENT AND FUTURE RESULTS
Once all these data is available to the analyst some guidelines for the interpretation
of results are the following:
 Assets whose representation in matrix of Figure 3 is similar to the one in
Figure 4. For all these elements observed criticality (S’x, ff’x) is lower than
potential  (Sx, ff’x).  Regarding  these  elements,  some  of  the  following
statements could be applicable:
Figure 4. Potential and Current criticality representation (within the matrix)
i. Dynamic capabilities to avoid serious failures consequences or fault
propagation are somehow in place, and although some of the assets
may still have a high frequency of failures (see for instance asset i in
Figure 3), consequences are low due to this fact. 
ii. Passive mitigation mechanism to avoid consequences of functional
losses  have  been  successfully  introduced  (redundancy,  passive
safety and environmental protections, etc.).
iii. Predictive maintenance programs are mature, and levels of potential
and functional failures are properly selected once the consistency of
the  failure  mode  PF  interval  is  well  studied  and  known  (See
Moubray’s Maxim 2 formulated in [13]).   
x’                                   x ff ’x
SxS’x
x’’                                    
ff ’’x
Figure 5. Representation of criticality changes, in a matrix, over time
x’                                   x ff ’x
SxS’x
 Assets whose representation in current criticality matrix (Figure 2) over
time (x’→ x’’  for t’’=t’+Δt tΔt ) is improving in criticality due to a reduction in
functional loss frequency over time (ff’x→ ff’’x), as in Figure 5. For all these
elements observed criticality is becoming lower and some of the following
statements could be applicable:
iv. At time t’, the opportunity for an operational reliability improvement
was  detected.  For  instance,  through  a  benchmarking  of  industry
standards  for  current  assets  operational  conditions  existing  PM
programs  were  optimized;  or  for  example,  operational  reliability
enhancements  were  discussed  with  equipment  vendors  offering
their  experience  and  best  estimates  to  consider  environmental
factors  and  current  operating  conditions  inside  existing  PM
programs. 
v. An  elimination  of  failure  latent  root  causes  in  assets  was
accomplished.  Some  programmatic  and  organizational  measures
were introduced to discard these latent failure causes (Root Cause
Failure Analysis Effect).
vi. There have been proper adjustments of the PM program to existing
asset  operational  conditions  by  accomplishing  a  RCM  program
(Reliability  Centred  Maintenance  effect).  RCM  programs  reached
lower failure rates in critical assets, but also possibly lower failure
consequences as explained in ii.   RCM programs should be carried
out  once  no  abnormal  functional  loss  frequency,  in  high  severity
equipment,  is  found  (i.e.  it  is  convenient  once  point  v  is
accomplished). 
 In many occasions, cost-risk-benefit analysis may lead to the discard of PM
activities for non-critical assets (for instance, for those in the white area in
Figure 1). Assets with criticality (S’y, ffy), as shown in Figure 6, could become
the target of the analysis if they deserve important preventive attention at
the moment of the analysis (favorite candidate assets would be: j, f & e in
Figure  1,  notice  how  asset  c  is  in  the  white  area,  but  could  potentially
become  semi-critical  in  case  of  increasing  its  functional  loss  frequency,
therefore it would not be a favorite candidate asset for this analysis).
The PM tasks to discard should not be those ones avoiding early equipment
deterioration; otherwise a significant increase in the LCC of the asset could
happen. Nevertheless, even taking into account this consideration, we may
expect an increase in functional loss frequency (see Figure 6,  ffy→ ff’y) and
criticality (S’y, ff’y)  as a result of less monitoring, inspection, or calibration
activities on the asset (activities typically  discarded or reduced after the
analysis). Severity of the assets failures should also be under control before
any discard of PM activities. Functional loss severity could make the asset to
exceed the low criticality area, white area in the matrix, increasing business
risk.  Resulting  criticality  after  discarding  PM  activities  (S’’y, ff’y)  should
remain within the white area in the matrix (see Figure 6).
x’                                   x ff ’x
SxS’x
x’’                                    ff’’x
High criticality area
Low criticality area
y’                                   y’’ 
y                                    
ff ’y
ffy
S’’yS’y
Figure 6. Risk-cost-Optimization programs for non critical (y) assets
It is important to notice that failures with minor consequences tend to be
allowed to occur, precisely because they may not matter very much. As a
result, large quantities of historical data are normally available concerning
these failures, which mean that there will be sufficient material for accurate
actuarial analyses if required.
 In other occasions,  assets may remain with a high severity and very low
functional loss frequency (See asset b in Figure 1).  To these elements the
Resnikoff Conundrum is applicable (this conundrum states that in order to
collect failure data, there must be equipment failures, but failures of critical
items are considered unacceptable, causing damage, injury and death. This
means that the maintenance program for a critical item must be designed
without the benefit of failure data which the program is meant to avoid).
For a failure with serious consequences, the body of data will never exist,
since preventive measures must of necessity be taken after the first failure
or  even  before  it.  Thus  actuarial  analysis  cannot  be  used  to  protect
operating safety.  This contradiction applies in reverse at the other end of
the  scale  of  consequences,  as  we  have  discussed  in  the  previous  bullet.
Therefore, for these elements, maintenance professionals should turn their
attention  away  from  counting  failures  (in  the  hope  that  an  elegantly
constructed  scorecard  will  tell  us  how  to  play  the  game  in  the  future),
towards anticipating or preventing failures which matter [11].
5. VALIDATION OF THE MODEL AND THE MODEL STRENGHTS
Since  2007,  authors  have  implemented  this  model  in  a  series  of  critical
infrastructures in Spain and South America,  through different collaboration and
R&D projects with a clear purpose of infrastructure maintenance reengineering
and  alignment  to  business  needs.  The  type  of  infrastructure  analyzed  were:
Electrical power generation plants (all types, including renewable energy plants),
network utilities (electricity, gas & water), transportation systems (like the one we
use as an example in this paper) and networks, army warships, etc. Over 250.000
assets have been ranked in different type of plants or infrastructure in general.
Over these years the methodology depicted in this paper has been upgraded and
different utility models (including software tools) have been developed. 
As an example,  average number of assets ranked per power plant was over
9.900, while for regasification plants over 14.000 assets, or 700 (non- repetitive
assets)  for a  train model.  There is  no reference in literature  to a methodology
dealing with such a massive asset criticality assessment.
Again, as an example trying to validate the methodology, Figure 7 presents a
case  study where 9921  systems are  analyzed  in  a  four  years  old  power  plant.
Purpose  of  the  study  was  to  audit  current  maintenance  management.  For  this
particular case, after a first round of analysis (prior to the method application) the
review  team  decided  to  rank  only  4816  of  those  assets,  considered  now  as
technical locations (TLs) in the ERP of the company. The only reason for this was
the consideration of the rest of the assets (5015, up to the total amount 9,921) as
auxiliary  equipment  of  the  plant  that  were  not  relevant  for  the  suggested
maintenance study.   
# Maintenance Plans (MPs)    
(In corporate ERP)
Period 06/2007-08/2013
24.065 Plans (MPs)
Over a total of 3.140 TL
In Matrix
4.816 TLs
TLs with MPs
2.823 TLs
Severity (30-100)
1.027 TL (With MPs)
Severity (0-30) 
1.796 TL (With MPs)
Left Out of 
The Matrix
5015 TLs
TLs with MPs
317 TLs
Potential TLs
to discard 
maintenance
2.123
Figure 7. Case Study:  Priority for 9921 systems – Power plant – Results 1
After  two  months  the  criticality  analysis  process  was  finished,  the  team
realized  that  2,123  technical  locations  of  the  plant  (Figure  7)  had  assets  with
preventive maintenance plans (MPs) assigned having null or very low severity in
consequences and deserving probably less maintenance efforts. It was curios to
appreciate (See Figure 8)  how preventive  maintenance efforts  in low criticality
assets,  after  four  years  of  operation  of  the  plant  and  considering  a  planning
horizon of 5 more years, would be almost 40% higher than in medium and high
criticality items. For this case study around 70% of the 41,387.7 h were discarded,
directly changing hours assigned to them in the MPs introduced in ERP, and 10%
of those hours were dedicated to high criticality equipment preventive MPs. After
5 years of operation, in 2013, same performance of the plant was reached with a
30%  savings  in  overall  maintenance  cost  (direct  &  indirect  cost)  only  by
redirecting and aligning maintenance efforts to business needs using this criticality
analysis. Similar results have been obtained when dealing with this issue in other
scenarios,  even  for  companies  showing  high  maturity  levels  in  many  in
maintenance related topics.  
   
 
Severity (30-100)
1.027 TL (With MPs)
8.634 PMs, for a total of 29,331.4 h.
24.065 PMs
70,629.1 h
Potential TLs to discard maintenance
2.123 TLs
15.431 PMs, for a total of 41,387.7 h.
Figure 2. Case Study:  Priority for 9921 systems – Power plant – Results 2
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper contains the design of a process and model for criticality analysis with
maintenance purposes and specific design constraints. The methodology ensures
analysis consistency to business needs and for existing data of in-service complex
engineering assets. At the same time, there is an effort to describe how to turn this
process into a practical management tool. Issues arising related to extensive data
handling  and  easy  results  representation  are  addressed.  Finally,  guidelines  for
results interpretation are offered. The authors believe that this type of analysis will
become a  must  for  complex in-service  assets  maintenance strategy review and
redesign.  Further  research  can  use  this  methodology  for  the  improvement  of
specific  operational  scenarios,  or  to  refine  the  different  steps  of  the  process
presented in this work. 
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